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In 1991 Goodale, Milner and their colleagues reported the case
of DF, a patient with a severe form of visual form agnosia. DF was
surprisingly adept at using visual information to guide her actions
despite her profound perceptual difﬁculties (Goodale, Milner,
Jakobson, & Carey, 1991; Milner et al., 1991). These perceptual def-
icits were caused by bilateral lesions to the lateral surface of the
posterior aspects of the temporal cortex (James, Culham, Hum-
phrey, Milner, & Goodale, 2003; Milner et al., 1991). The observa-
tions in DF were related to a well-known distinction between the
ventral and dorsal visual streams of the primate visual cortex.
According to this classiﬁcation the ventral stream consists of areas
in the occipito-temporal and temporal cortex and the dorsal
stream comprises areas in the occipito-parietal and parietal cortex
(Ungerleider & Haxby, 1994; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). It was
argued that DF’s lesions effectively disconnected her ventral
stream from visual input (Milner et al., 1991). Her preserved visu-
omotor abilities were thus regarded as evidence that the ventral
stream plays no direct role in the visual control of movements giv-
ing rise to the perception/action model (Milner & Goodale, 1995,
2006). The central claim of this model is that the two visual
streams serve distinct behavioural roles. The ventral stream pro-
vides vision for perception, is connected to neural structures re-
lated to memory and cognition and only plays an indirect role in
the visual guidance of action. In contrast the dorsal visual stream
has direct links with the motor cortex and is thus directly involved
in the control of action. In a recent discussion paper we examined
the evidence for and against the perception/action model. We con-ll rights reserved.cluded, that the core assumption of the perception/action model of
two independent visual streams serving two distinct behavioural
purposes has become difﬁcult to maintain in the face of recent evi-
dence (Schenk & McIntosh, 2010). Instead we suggested that for
most examples of visuomotor behaviour input from both the dor-
sal and ventral streams will be combined. In their reply Goodale
and Milner (2010) challenged this conclusion and argued that
our view is incompatible with the remarkable range of normal vis-
uomotor performance found in the visual form agnostic patient DF.
In this article I will examine this challenge. For this purpose I
distinguish between two possible accounts of visuomotor control:
the segregation and the integration account. The segregation-ac-
count assumes that the two visual streams serve different behav-
ioural roles. It is assumed that only one of them, the dorsal
stream, is directly involved in the control of action. In contrast
the integration account assumes that both streams are directly in-
volved in the control of action.
My aim is to show that an integration account of visuomotor
control is in fact compatible with DF’s visuomotor behaviour and
can account better for ﬁndings obtained in healthy participants.
However, before I can present the case for the integration account
I should ﬁrst justify why I think the segregation account is unsat-
isfactory. This will be done in the following section.2. Is the ventral system only indirectly involved in action?
To see whether the segregation account can explain the pattern
of preserved and impaired behaviour found in DF it is crucial that
we understand which aspects of behaviour are supposedly served
by the ventral and the dorsal visual streams. A superﬁcial under-
standing of the perception/action model suggests a very simple an-
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stream and the ventral stream is only involved in perceptual tasks.
However, this view is wrong and Milner and Goodale (1995, 2006,
2008) consistently stressed that the ventral stream does play a role
in the visual control in action albeit an indirect one.
This distinction between a direct versus an indirect role in the
visual control of action is somewhat fuzzy. Milner, Goodale and
colleagues (Dijkerman, McIntosh, Schindler, Nijboer, & Milner,
2009; Goodale & Milner, 2010; Milner & Goodale, 1995, 2006,
2008) use the well-known distinction between motor-program-
ming and motor planning to make the distinction between direct
and indirect visual control of action clearer. In the following I will
therefore introduce and discuss the programming-planning dis-
tinction. But ﬁrst I should clarify how in the perception–action
model the distinctions of direct versus indirect control, program-
ming versus planning and ventral versus dorsal streams relate to
each other. A direct role of vision in action control means that vi-
sion contributes to the programming of speciﬁc actions. The mean-
ing of indirect control is less well-deﬁned. Motor planning is one
example of indirect control, but not necessarily the only one. An-
other example is visual attention. Visual processes involved in
guiding our attention can make the observer aware of the need
to produce a motor response without necessarily providing the
speciﬁc information that will shape that response. In this sense vi-
sual processes involved in attention are also seen as processes
which may only indirectly inﬂuence action (Milner & Goodale,
1995, Chapter 7). How does this distinction between direct and
indirect control of action map onto the ventral–dorsal distinction?
According to the perception–action model only the dorsal stream
can support direct visual control of action. This means the dorsal
stream can be involved in motor programming and planning, but
the ventral stream can only be involved in motor planning but
not in motor programming. However, such a claim is only useful
if we have reliable criteria to distinguish between programming
and planning. Do we have such criteria? In the next paragraphs I
will ﬁrst describe the origin of the programming-planning distinc-
tion before I discuss whether reliable criteria for this distinction
can be found.
The distinction between motor programming and planning goes
back to Schmidt’s (1975) motor schema theory. The core concept in
this theory is the motor schema: a template for carrying out spe-
ciﬁc motor skills which retains sufﬁcient ﬂexibility to account for
our ability to execute the same skill under varying circumstances.
A typical example is the writing of letters. Once we learned to write
a speciﬁc letter, we can do that on vastly different spatial scales,
with different writing utensils and different effectors (Plamondon,
Stelmach, & Teasdale, 1990; Stelmach, Mullins, & Teulings, 1984).
Such variations like spatial scale, employed tool or effector are seen
as parameters of the schema. These parameters have to be speci-
ﬁed before an executable motor program is created. This process
of parameter-speciﬁcation is called motor programming and it is
distinguished from motor planning – the selection of different mo-
tor schemas.
Milner and Goodale’s (1995, 2006, 2008) deﬁnitions of these
concepts are similar, although their deﬁnitions have a more phys-
iological ﬂavour. They assume that visuomotor control employs a
collection of specialized visuomotor circuits which we inherited
from more primitive animals. These visuomotor circuits are de-
ﬁned by pre-determined sensory/input-channels linked to speciﬁc
motor/output channels. Although these input–output mappings
are ﬁxed and deﬁne a given visuomotor circuit, they can be
adapted to speciﬁc motor tasks. For example, we might have a cir-
cuit for grasping movements, but the grasping movements will
need to be modiﬁed to take account of the size and form of the ob-
ject and the distance between hand and object. These circuits can
be seen as pre-deﬁned programs containing motor variables thatare adjustable on the basis of sensory input. These adjustments
are called motor programming. In contrast, the process of selecting
a circuit or combination of circuits for a speciﬁc behavioural goal is
called motor planning. Replace the terms ‘‘visuomotor circuit” with
‘‘motor schema” and the deﬁnitions for motor programming and
planning in the perception–action model become the same as
those in Schmidt’s (1975) motor schema theory.
Schmidt’s motor schema theory is therefore a good place to look
for clear criteria distinguishing motor programming and planning.
Unfortunately, it is exactly the absence of such criteria which in re-
cent reviews of the motor schema theory has been identiﬁed as its
main ﬂaw (Alexander, Delong, & Crutcher, 1992; Shaffer, 1992).
This is also a problem for the perception/action model. Without
such criteria we cannot decide whether a failure by DF to perform
a given visuomotor task should be regarded as a planning error (as
expected by the perception/action model) or a programming error.
But why is it so difﬁcult to distinguish between programming and
planning errors? Let us assume that to pick up a speciﬁc object DF
uses an abnormal grasp. Is this a programming error or a planning
error? According to the motor schema theory the answer has to be
the following: If DF’s grasp and the normal grasp correspond to dif-
ferent motor schemas, DF’s error is a failure in selecting the correct
schema and is therefore a planning error. If however, the incorrect
and normal grasps are variations of the same motor schema, the
error is a failure to determine the correct value for the relevant
parameter of the motor schema and is thus a programming error.
This distinction is easy to make at a theoretical level, but very dif-
ﬁcult to make in practice. Such a decision requires that we know
which movements (or in our example which grasps) are variations
of the same motor schema or expressions of two distinct schemas.
This knowledge is, however, not available. Given that researchers
cannot even agree whether motor schemas exist (Summers & An-
son, 2009), even less agreement should be expected when it comes
to decide whether two movements or skills belong to the same or
different schemas.
Dijkerman et al. (2009) tried to address this problem by provid-
ing their own criteria. Motor planning involves the selection of
higher-order aspects of movements such as the type of grasp or
the hand to be used. In contrast, motor programming relates to
movement parameters that bear a direct relation to the relevant vi-
sual characteristic of the visuomotor task. A typical example for the
latter would be the speciﬁcation of the size of hand-opening as
determined by the size of the object. But does this deﬁnition help?
Their motor planning deﬁnition is not more speciﬁc than the one
which we already had. Their deﬁnition of motor programming is
more speciﬁc, but difﬁcult to apply to individual actions. To deter-
mine whether the relation between relevant visual characteristics
and relevant movement parameters corresponds to ‘‘a relatively
direct translation” we need to know the relevant visual character-
istics of the task and the parameters of the movement. This may
appear very clear in a given example (e.g. grasping: object size
and hand-opening). But this clarity reﬂects more our lack of imag-
ination than any form of knowledge. In fact it turns out that the
relationship between visual and movement parameters depends
on how you analyse a speciﬁc visuomotor task.
Let’s take the example of reaching or pointing. One possible way
of analysing this task would suggest that the relevant visual
parameter is the perceived distance between observer and target
and the relevant motor parameter is the required movement
amplitude (i.e. distance between the hand’s start and end position).
In this case the relationship between visual and movement param-
eters is direct and simple. But we would be equally justiﬁed in
assuming that the relevant ‘‘motor parameters” are the joints con-
tributing to the movement and the degree of joint extensions
needed to transform the starting posture into the required ﬁnal
posture. If we adopt the latter description – (a position favoured
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mehr, & Ivry, 2009; Todorov, 2004; Wolpert & Ghahramani,
2000) a mapping of visual distance onto required joint movements
is required. Such a mapping is certainly not direct and simple.
Thus, to apply the criteria suggested by Dijkerman et al. (2009)
we need to know which parameters the brain uses for a given vis-
uomotor task. However, in many cases this is not known or as in
the case of grasping is the subject of controversy (Hoff & Arbib,
1993; Smeets & Brenner, 1999).
Moreover, if we hoped that electrophysiological recordings
from the motor cortex might provide the answer, we will again
be disappointed. Early electrophysiological recordings from mon-
keys suggested that at the population level such ‘‘high level” move-
ment parameters as movement direction are encoded in the motor
cortex (Georgopoulos, Kalaska, Caminiti, & Massey, 1982). But this
claim is now disputed by Todorov (2000a). In Todorov’s model the
motor cortex codes low-level aspects of the movement, namely
muscle group activations. Todorov (2000a) argues that earlier
interpretations of the signals from the motor cortex did not take
into consideration the state-dependence of muscle-force produc-
tion and multi-joint mechanics. If this is taken into account, corti-
cal signals for the activation of speciﬁc muscle groups will be
correlated with ‘‘high level” movement kinematics. This means
that correlations between single-unit recordings and high-level
kinematics cannot be taken as evidence for the representation of
high-level features at the level of the motor cortex. In fact Todorov
(2000a) showed that a model based on low-level movement fea-
tures cannot only account for the observed correlation with high-
level kinematics, but also account for some otherwise difﬁcult to
explain electrophysiological ﬁndings (for an interesting discussion
of these claims, see: Georgopoulos & Ashe, 2000; Moran & Sch-
wartz, 2000; Scott, 2000a, 2000b; Todorov, 2000b). Thus, neither
models of motor control nor neurophysiological data allow us to
identify the relevant visual and motor parameters. Without this
knowledge it is impossible to say whether a given visuo-to-motor
mapping corresponds to a ‘‘direct translation” and thus impossible
to apply Dijkerman et al.’s (2009) deﬁnition of motor programming.
But it is not just the speciﬁc distinction between programming
and planning which falls short of providing a convincing explana-
tion for DF’s visuomotor behaviour. It also seems unlikely that any
other motor-based criteria will fare any better. For example DF
shows normal grip-point selection when picking up ellipsoid ob-
jects (Goodale, Meenan et al., 1994c) but falters when picking up
cross-shaped objects (Carey, Harvey, & Milner, 1996). Similarly
she shows normal posting behaviour for a simple rectangular card
(Milner et al., 1991), but is impaired when posting a T-shaped ob-
ject (Goodale, Jakobson et al., 1994b). It seems that visual rather
than motor demands determine the ventral stream’s involvement
in visuomotor control and this is best shown by studies examining
the role of depth cues in reaching. DF’s reaching and grasping
behaviour diverges signiﬁcantly from normal performance when
binocular and extraretinal depth-cues are distorted or removed
(Carey, Dijkerman, & Milner, 1998; Dijkerman, Milner, & Carey,
1996, 1999; Marotta, Behrmann, & Goodale, 1997; Mon-Williams,
Tresilian, McIntosh, & Milner, 2001b). It appears that the ventral
stream is not needed for reaching when binocular and extraretinal
cues are available, but in their absence an intact ventral stream be-
comes essential for normal visuomotor performance.
I have tried to show that the distinction between direct and
indirect visual control of action and the associated dichotomy be-
tween motor programming and planning are problematic. One
problem is that it is difﬁcult to apply those dichotomies to concrete
examples of visuomotor behaviour. This in turn makes it difﬁcult
to use those distinctions to predict when the ventral stream will
become involved in visuomotor behaviour. Moreover, looking at
DF’s behaviour it appears that the two visual streams differ primar-ily in terms of the sensory information they can provide rather
than in terms of the motor behaviour they control.
Thus with respect to its role in the control of movement the two
visual streams do not seem to be categorically different. But this
similarity does not mean the dorsal and ventral stream’s contribu-
tion to visuomotor behaviour is equal. Evidence from functional
imaging suggests that the dorsal system is more specialized for vis-
uomotor control than the ventral system. A number of dorsal-
stream areas have selectively enhanced activity during visuomotor
tasks (Culham, Gallivan, Cavina-Pratesi, & Quinlan, 2008; Culham &
Valyear, 2006), but the same is not true for areas in the ventral
stream (e.g. Cavina-Pratesi, Goodale, & Culham, 2007). Thus it
might be that while the computational contribution of areas in
the dorsal stream are more suited for visuomotor guidance, areas
in the ventral stream provide information that can contribute to
a greater variety of visual behaviour. However, specialization does
not imply exclusivity. Ultimately visuomotor behaviour draws on
information from both streams. It is this richness of information
supply which provides the basis for an alternative explanation of
visuomotor robustness after ventral-stream damage.3. Integration as a basis of visuomotor robustness
I argued above, that ventral-stream areas are directly involved in
the control of visuomotor behaviour. Such a viewpoint faces an
obvious problem. How can we account for the apparently normal
visuomotor behaviour of patients with ventral-stream lesions?
The classical explanation for this visuomotor robustness involved
the assumption that the ventral stream is only indirectly involved
in the control of visuomotor behaviour. But as we have seen above,
the assumption that we can objectively discriminate between a di-
rect and indirect role of vision in action is not justiﬁed.We therefore
need an alternative account of visuomotor robustness. Our alterna-
tive explanation is based on the following presupposition: Both the
ventral and dorsal streams contribute useful visual information for
visuomotor control, but in many conditions the information from
the two streams contain some degree of redundancy. A typical
example is provided by reaching for targets in depth. To estimate
a target’s position in depth many different cues can be used
(Mamassian & Landy, 2001; Landy, Maloney, Johnston, & Young,
1995). Binocular disparity, vergence angle, motion parallax, vertical
gaze angle, but also pictorial-depth cues such as familiar size and
perspective cues can help us to establish the position of a target
in depth. Some of those cues, such as the pictorial-depth cues, will
come from ventral-stream areas, but others will not. It is plausible
to assume that the brain will make use of many of those cues to
achieve the best and most reliable estimate of a target position
and thereby to produce an accurate reaching movement. However,
not all of the cues are always needed to achieve a good estimate of
the target-position. Thus, when some of those cues are no longer
available either as consequence of brain damage or degradation of
the sensory environment, the effects on reaching accuracy might
be minimal. Consequently, no impairments will be observed. We
know that in healthy subjects the effects of removing or distorting
one depth cue are often hardly detectable (e.g. Marotta et al., 1997;
Mon-Williams, Tresilian et al., 2001b; Wann, Mon-Williams, McIn-
tosh, Smyth, &Milner, 2001).We should, therefore, not be surprised
that the loss of one depth cue will leave a patient’s motor perfor-
mance unaffected. In this context it is important to remind the
reader that the demonstrations of visuomotor robustness after ven-
tral-stream damage are based on single-case studies. Such single-
case studies have substantially lower statistical power than group
studies. This means that only substantial deﬁcits lead to signiﬁcant
differences between normal and patient behaviour (Crawford &
Garthwaite, 2005, 2006).
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tion account differs in one respect from the classical or segregation
account. The segregation-account assumes that the ventral stream
is only indirectly involved in visuomotor control. The segregation
account therefore implies that visuomotor control without an in-
tact ventral stream can serve as a model of normal visuomotor con-
trol. This idea is rejected by the integration account. The
integration account assumes that the visuomotor processes in such
patients are different from the normal ones. In particular, it is as-
sumed that ventral-stream damaged patients lost some of the rel-
evant visual input. Consequently, their visuomotor processes will
be more impoverished. This leads to two predictions: Firstly, nor-
mal visuomotor behaviour will be affected by cues, which are as-
sumed to be processed in the ventral stream. Secondly,
visuomotor behaviour of patients with ventral-stream damage is
less ﬂexible and more vulnerable in impoverished sensory
environments.
Is there any evidence that cues processed in the ventral stream
have an effect on visuomotor behaviour? Many pictorial illusions,
such as the Ponzo, Ebbinghaus and Mueller-Lyer illusions, are
based on pictorial-depth cues whose neuronal origin is assumed
to lie in the ventral stream (e.g. Goodale & Milner, 2010). While ini-
tial reports claimed that visual illusions do not affect visuomotor
behaviour (Aglioti, Desouza, & Goodale, 1995; Bridgeman, Lewis,
Heit, & Nagle, 1979), this claim was frequently (but not always)
contradicted by later studies (see Franz, 2001; Franz & Gegenfurt-
ner, 2008). Moreover, two recent meta-analyses (looking at the ef-
fect of the Mueller-Lyer illusion on pointing and grasping) conﬁrm
that the effect of illusions on actions are signiﬁcant, while often
smaller than the effects on perceptual tasks (Bruno, Bernardis, &
Gentilucci, 2008; Bruno & Franz, 2009). This ﬁnding is precisely
what would be expected, if pictorial cues provide one out of many
visuomotor cues. However, the interpretation of the effects of illu-
sion on action has been dogged by controversy for many years
(Smeets & Brenner, 2006). Moreover, a recent fMRI study (Murray,
Boyaci, & Kersten, 2006) showed that pictorial illusions already
have an effect on activation in primary visual cortex. This ﬁnding
has cast doubt on the assumption that such illusions have a ven-
tral-stream origin.
Less controversial is the neural origin of the familiar-size cue.
This cue originates from the ventral stream. The familiar-size cue
relies on our knowledge of the size of familiar objects. Obviously
this information is only available for objects which can be recog-
nized and object recognition involves the ventral stream (e.g. Kar-
nath, Ruter, Mandler, & Himmelbach, 2009). If we recognize an
object and know its physical size, we can use this information in
a grasping task to adjust the opening of our hand to the size of
the object. Furthermore, our visual system can also compare the
size of the object’s image on the retina to its known physical size
and derive from this comparison an estimate of the object’s dis-
tance to the observer. Consequently if we present an exemplar of
an object, whose real size is smaller than its normal size, subjects
will believe that the object has its well-known normal size and is
just further away from the observer. If subjects use the familiar-
size cue for grasping, we expect to see an exaggerated reaching
amplitude and hand-opening. This is what McIntosh and Lashley
(2008) found in their experiment – further evidence that ventral
stream information is used in normal visuomotor control.
But what is the evidence for the claim that ventral-stream dam-
age leads to reduced visuomotor ﬂexibility? A number of studies
on DF can be cited in support of this claim. Several authors showed
that DF’s reaching and prehension performance is impaired in the
absence of binocular cues (Carey et al., 1998; Dijkerman et al.,
1996; Marotta et al., 1997). Furthermore, Mon-Williams and col-
leagues showed in an elegant series of experiments, that DF relies
almost exclusively on vergence and vertical gaze angle to guide herhand to targets in depth (Mon-Williams, McIntosh et al., 2001a;
Mon-Williams, Tresilian et al., 2001b; Wann et al., 2001). Healthy
subjects can combine pictorial cues with binocular cues to esti-
mate an object’s distance in depth. DF cannot use pictorial cues
and instead relies on binocular cues, motion parallax and extra-ret-
inal information (such as vertical gaze angle) to estimate an ob-
ject’s distance in depth. Accordingly, when such information is
removed her visuomotor performance falls well below the normal
level.
In summary, there is evidence from both healthy subjects and
DF that a ventral-stream deprived brain is not a good model of
the normal visuomotor system. Instead patients without an intact
ventral stream rely on a signiﬁcantly smaller set of sensory cues to
guide their actions than neurologically intact subjects. These ﬁnd-
ings support the integration account. It might therefore be useful
to describe this account in more detail. The claim that multiple
cues from areas across the visual cortex are involved in visuomotor
behaviour should not be confused with the idea of a common rep-
resentation. The common-representation hypothesis assumes that
the visual cortex gives rise to one single, uniﬁed visual representa-
tion which forms the basis for all visual behaviour. As Milner and
Goodale (1995) pointed out, such a view would be inconsistent
with the normal visuomotor performance which was found across
a range of tasks in DF. If all behaviour (including motor behaviour)
were based on the same uniﬁed perceptual representation, percep-
tual deﬁcits would be expected to lead to corresponding visuomo-
tor deﬁcits.
The alternative to a single visual representation is, however, not
necessarily a strict segregation between vision for perception and
action. Instead the alternative, suggested here, is the existence of
multiple visual processes producing multiple visual cues, recruited
from the entire visual cortex and combined in a ﬂexible way to suit
the requirements of the behavioural task. In this scenario there is
neither a rigid divide between visual processes for action and per-
ception nor the assumption that all visual processes will converge
on one common representation. In the context of visuomotor con-
trol it may be more useful to think of those visual cues not as input
but as constraints. The cues do not necessarily produce a new vi-
sual ‘‘representation” but constrain the selection process, which
for a given visuomotor task leads to the optimal combinations of
muscle activations. We can assume that the selection and combi-
nation of cues used for visuomotor behaviour will be guided by
similar principles guiding the multisensory combination of cues
for perceptual tasks (Ernst & Banks, 2002; Schrater & Kersten,
2000). One such principle of optimal cue-combination is that high-
er weights are given to more reliable cues. This has been conﬁrmed
by a number of studies (see Ernst & Buelthoff, 2004; Schrater &
Kersten, 2000). It seems that this principle generalises to spatial
reference frames. Byrne and Crawford (2010) recently demon-
strated that the reliability and stability of sensory cues affects
the relative contribution of egocentric versus allocentric informa-
tion for memory-guided reaches.
Time might be another factor guiding the selection and combi-
nation of visual cues used in the control of motor behaviour
(Greenwald, Knill, & Saunders, 2005). Actions often have to be exe-
cuted within very tight temporal constraints, while at the same
time some visual processes will take longer than others. It is there-
fore plausible to assume that the time constraints imposed by a
motor task will affect the selection of sensory cues by which it is
guided. For example, time constraints seem to play an important
role in the selection of the neuronal pathways which are used to
guide sensorimotor behaviour. Dramatic demonstrations of this
are provided by the phenomenon of paradoxical movements
(Glickstein & Stein, 1991). Paradoxical movements are near-normal
movements observed under speciﬁc conditions in patients with
movement disorders. A typical example is the striking contrast be-
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kinson’s disease (Majsak, Kaminski, Gentile, & Flanagan, 1998).
While the seemingly easier task of grasping a stationary object is
carried out slowly and with great difﬁculty, catching is carried
out with ease and at normal speed. An experiment carried out in
Parkinson patients with implanted deep-brain stimulators showed
that paradoxical and non-paradoxical movements rely on different
sensorimotor circuits (Schenk, Baur, Steude, & Boetzel, 2003). Fur-
thermore, a study of a patient with post-traumatic ataxia allowed
us to identify external temporal constraints as the most critical fac-
tor in triggering paradoxical movements (Schenk & Mai, 1999). To-
gether, these ﬁndings suggest that the temporal requirements of
the visuomotor task can determine the selection of sensorimotor
circuits.
More speciﬁcally, De’Sperati and Baud-Bovy (2008) recently
showed that the temporal characteristics of an action also deter-
mine what visual information is used to guide it. They found, that
the ﬂash-lag illusion affects only long-delay saccades. Interest-
ingly, de Grave and Bruno (2010) also observed a link between sac-
cade-latency and the effects of a visual illusion (the Mueller-Lyer
illusion), but in their case long-latency saccades were less affected
by the illusion. To make matters even more confusing, it has also
been shown, that pictorial-depth cues become available at a short-
er latency than binocular cues (van Mierlo, Louw, Smeets, & Bren-
ner, 2009). These apparent contradictions may be due to
differences in the employed tasks, motor responses and stimuli.
Taken together this research suggests, that time is an important
factor in determining what information is used in visuomotor con-
trol. However, it remains to be established how the temporal
requirements of the task guide the selection of visual information
in different conditions. But time is not the only factor. Findings
from DF suggest that the memory-requirements of a visuomotor
task also determine which visual brain structures are involved
(for a discussion of this interesting topic, see: Franz, Hesse, & Kol-
lath, 2009; Goodale, Jakobson, & Keillor, 1994a; Hesse & Franz,
2009; Rice-Cohen, Cross, Tunik, Grafton, & Culham, 2009; Rossit,
Szymanek, Butler, & Harvey, 2010; Schenk & McIntosh, 2010).
To conclude, the integration account explains why patients such
as DF seem to operate almost normally in a natural visual environ-
ment, rich in sensory cues, but show signiﬁcant problems in a more
impoverished sensory environment. It should be noted that a sim-
ilar account was used to explain why the effect of illusions varies
with the behavioural task (Geisler & Kersten, 2002; Hartung, Schr-
ater, Buelthoff, Kersten, & Franz, 2005; Smeets, Brenner, de Grave,
& Cujpers, 2002). By accepting the integration account we also
acknowledge that the ventral-stream deprived brain is not a neural
model of the normal, visuomotor system. Moreover, as I will de-
scribe in the last section this account has implications for the fu-
ture conduct of neuropsychological research.4. Conclusions
Uncovering the contribution of ventral-stream areas to the con-
trol of visuomotor behaviour poses an interesting challenge. I ar-
gued above that ventral-stream areas are involved in the control
of visuomotor behaviour, but unlike some of the areas in the dorsal
stream they are not necessarily specialized for visuomotor control
or perception. Instead they act as multipurpose visual tools. This
means identifying their contribution to visuomotor behaviour
using functional imaging is difﬁcult. The functional-imaging ap-
proach typically relies on the activation-difference between vi-
sion-only versus vision-plus-action conditions (or the contrast
between different types of actions) to identify action-relevant
areas. In the case of multipurpose areas such differences cannot
be expected. Multipurpose areas might contribute to both percep-tual and motor tasks without necessarily being more active in
either of them. The data from a recent functional imaging study,
which contrasted the activity of areas AIP and LO in a vision-only
task with two visuomotor tasks (i.e. reaching and grasping), dem-
onstrates this problem (Cavina-Pratesi et al., 2007). They found
that while AIP clearly emerges as a critical area for grasping, when
contrasting vision-only with grasping or grasping with reaching, LO
was not highlighted by either of these contrasts. However, far from
being silent in all of those conditions, the examination of the bold-
response in LO clearly demonstrated signiﬁcant activity in all three
conditions. Such a ﬁnding cannot demonstrate the potential rele-
vance of LO for visually-guided action. But it illustrates the limita-
tions of functional imaging in exploring the visuomotor role of
those areas that are specialized in terms of their computational
properties but not in terms of their behavioural role.
Neuropsychological examinations, therefore, becomes even
more important. Examinations of patients with damage in the ven-
tral stream can provide the evidence which functional imaging
cannot. Regardless of whether those areas in the ventral stream
are specialized for visuomotor control or not, if they are critically
involved, damage to them should result in impaired visuomotor
performance. However, when using this approach, it is important
to take the sensory redundancy of visuomotor control into account.
This redundancy implies that a given visuomotor task can be
solved using a variety of different sensorimotor strategies and sen-
sory cues. This insight prompts a change in research strategy. In
the past, reports on DF and similar patients emphasized the pa-
tients’ preserved visuomotor capacities. However, such preserved
capacities do not provide unequivocal information about the ven-
tral stream’s role in visuomotor control. Visuomotor performance
could be preserved because the ventral stream is not involved or
because alternative sources of visual information are used to com-
pensate for the missing ventral stream input. In contrast, visuomo-
tor deﬁcits after brain damage unequivocally demonstrate the
critical role of the damaged area for the affected visuomotor task.
It was DF’s surprising visuomotor robustness which turned her into
one of the most studied patients in the history of Neuropsychology.
But it might be her more subtle visuomotor deﬁcits which in future
might provide the more lasting insights into the neural control of
visuomotor behaviour.
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